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Experimental evidence on winning strategies of prisoner's dilemma
2017-02-20  【 】【打印】【关闭

Institute of Theoretical Physics

Chinese Academy of Sciences

 Key Laboratory of Theoretical Physics

Seminar

Title

题目

Experimental evidence on winning strategies of prisoner's dilemma

Speaker

报告人

Dr. Zhijian Wang

Affiliation

所在单位

Zhejiang University

Date

日期

20 February 2017, Monday: 15:30--16:30

Venue

地点

ITP NEW BUILDING 6420

Abstract

摘要

The iterated prisoner's dilemma game (IPD), relating to the social cooperation, is a basic model in social science. For long time, the mutual cooperation strategy is regarded as the best winning strategy in IPD. But, as recently discovered by Press and Dyson (2012), the zero-determinant (ZD) extortionate strategy can enforce a linear relationship between a pair of players' scores, and can enforce and exploit cooperation, providing the extortionate strategist with a score advantage, and consequently higher scores than those from the mutual cooperation. This result overturned several decades of consensus about the IPD. In laboratory experiments in which human subjects were paired with computer co-players (extortionate ZD strategists), we demonstrate that the extortionate ZD strategies indeed enforce a unilateral control of the reward. When the experimental setting is sufficiently long and the computerized nature of the opponent is known to human subjects, the extortionate ZD strategy outperforms --- significantly more extortionate strategists finally obtain an average score higher than that from mutual cooperation. At the end of the talk, we will discuss the potential existence of such extortionate strategists in the real life and the social network, the evolutionary processes of human when facing the extorters in experiments, and how to model the processes of the human learning to be extorted in the deep learning view.

Press, W. H. and Dyson, F. J. Iterated prisoner's dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 109, 10409--10413 (2012).
Hilbe, C. et al. Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in the prisoner's dilemma. Nature Communications, 5, 3976 (2014).
Wang, Z. et al. Extortion can outperform generosity in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Nature Communications, 7, 11125 (2016)

Contact Person

联系人

Hai-Jun Zhou
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